This paper critically reviews the way in which English judicial decisions have developed the labour law concept of 'mutuality of obligations'. The paper suggests that the primary purpose of this concept, as originally developed by Mark Freedland, was intended to be that of bringing to the fore of labour contract law analysis some relational aspects of work contracts that traditional contract law elements, such as contractual consideration, had typically failed to acknowledge. It argues that subsequent English court judgments have instead used mutuality as both i) a synonymous term of contractual consideration and ii) a pre-requisite of contractual continuity (in a vast range of personal work relations) in a way that clearly defeats the purpose of the concept as originally intended and unduly and adversely affects workers in precarious and atypical employment relations. 
simultaneously and seamlessly shaped both the orthodox English law concept of contract of employment and our individual (and sometimes more heterodox and critical) understandings of the contract of employment. In particular, his original work on the concept of 'mutuality of obligations' in the labour law context has been acknowledged by his peers as perhaps one of the most important contributions to the modern understanding of the contract of employment. 2 This paper seeks to provide a critical reconstruction of how the original intuitions made by Mark Freedland in respect of the contribution of the 'mutuality' concept to the understanding of work relationships in general, and precarious work relations in particular, have been subject over the years to a long series of judicial transformations that have essentially distorted the original rationale that the author attached to the idea of 'mutuality of obligations', while at the same time distancing it from the mischief that his work was trying to address. That original mischief emerges clearly from the early pages of his seminal 1976 monograph The Contract of Employment, where the author, having briefly introduced the 'element of mutual obligations in respect of future services', went on to state, in unequivocal terms that 'it is, in the view of this writer, a confusion of ideas to deny the existence of a contract of employment merely because the employment is for a short term and precarious.
Neither of those factors is inconsistent with the existence of the contract of employment'. 3 The present paper seeks to elaborate on the (few) uses and (many) misuses of the concept of mutuality of obligations that English labour law has developed over the years, while linking this specific analysis to the broader question of the 'Autonomy of Labour Law'. Often, and variably, referred to in case law as 'an irreducible minimum … to create a contract of services', 4 'an essential element of the contract of employment' 5 but also 'a necessary element in a "limb (b) contract"' (or 'worker' contract), 6 or 'the one important ingredient' for a contract of service to exist, 7 but also for any 'contract at all' or for 'a contract in the employment field' to exist, 8 mutuality has enjoyed an insuperable popularity in judicial reasoning, partly because of its unique characteristic of being credited, at the same time, as a 2 There is virtually no labour law textbook that in analysing the concept of mutuality of obligation in the context of the contract of employment does not refer to Mark Freedland seminal work in The Contract of Employment (Clarendon, 1976 ). 3 M. R. Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Clarendon, 1976) , 11. On a separate note, this may well be the first time a British legal author deploys the concept of precariousness in the labour law context, though it is arguable that, in his 1976 work, Freedland was predominantly referring to an idea of precariousness as equivalent to the casualisation inherent to the succession of very short term contracts of service, rather than to the employment status precariousness that we tend to associate to the post-O'Kelly labour markets 4 legal 'test … to found a contract [or] to found a contract of employment' 9 and as 'an essential element' of the structure of the contract of employment. Mutuality may well be the lapis philosophorum of English labour contract law, but the following pages will suggest that it is often used to turn gold into lead, rather than the other way round.
The present paper is composed of four main sections. The following section briefly explores the concept of 'Autonomy of Labour Law', identifies its three main components, and links them to the analysis of 'mutuality of obligations'. The third section begins by tracing the origins and subsequent development of 'mutuality of obligations' in English labour law, both from a doctrinal and from a jurisprudential perspective. This analysis explores the emergence of mutuality as a descriptive structural element of the contract of employment, but also its progressive transformation into a series of increasingly prescriptive and ubiquitous requirements or tests for identifying (and, by the same token, excluding) other elements of the contract of employment -and increasingly of contracts for personal work and services at large -such as contractuality, continuity, personality, bilaterality, and even (albeit in a more nuanced manner) subordination. In the following fourth section, the paper moves on to investigate the spread of the concept(s) of mutuality into other, mostly common law, jurisdictions with some brief references to European law. This part concludes by advancing the suggestion that while some particular manifestations of 'mutuality of obligations' appear to have transferred (or metastasised) to other legal systems, a number of the jurisdictions explored appear to have developed a certain resistance, if not outright immunity, to some or all of the more prescriptive and aggressive transmutations of the original, English law version, 'mutuality of obligations'. The subsequent fifth part queries whether the English law approach to 'mutuality' in the construction of personal work contracts is tenable and desirable from the point of view of conceptual clarity and heuristic viability, and in particular by reference to the idea of the 'Autonomy of Labour Law'. In conclusion, this paper tentatively suggests that by saying too much, mutuality is really saying too little to help our understanding of the structure of personal work contracts in general, and of the contract of employment in particular. 14 Labour law can thus be seen as entitled to make a rather credible and simultaneous claim to both active borrowing and autonomy, though it goes without saying that different legal traditions tend to strike different balances between the common law elements and the more properly understood labour law components of our discipline. 15 What is clear however is that labour law has certainly never embraced an idea of autonomy amounting to 'isolation'. As put by Collins '[a]lthough some fields of law such as contract and crime are marked by the quest of coherence according to a small set of principles, Labour Law, like other contextual fields such as Family Law, has never aspired to such conceptual unity'. 16 A contract of employment, in most legal systems, is both a 'contract', and a 'contract of employment', with the latter formulation usually factoring in a series of normatively laden elements that serve to distance its formation, structure, and functioning from a contract tout court.
With these caveats in mind, one could go on to suggest that the three main structural elements against which the autonomy of a discipline such as Labour Law ought to be evaluated are a) the presence of a set of legal institutions 17 regulating a coherently identifiable social phenomenon or set of phenomena, b) the presence of a set of original regulatory techniques and governance mechanisms, and c) the existence of an original ideology underpinning the normative action and development of the discipline. 18 In this context, 'mutuality of obligations', as it should become apparent in the following pages, is a useful concept to explore. As already noted by Anne Davies, properly understood 'mutuality of obligations is … an employment law requirement, not a contract law requirement' 19 and as such it could be seen as an original regulatory device deployed to structure the contract of employment, itself one of the key legal institutions of labour law.
However the following pages will also reveal the extent to which both contractual law principles and contract law reasoning have shaped and continue to shape the development of 'mutuality', and force the English notion of contract of employment, and to a certain extent
English labour law as a whole, to gravitate much more closely to its common contract law ideological nucleus than equivalent notions in other jurisdictions do, in a way that seriously detracts from a fully-fledged claim to autonomy, that both mutuality and the contract of employment would otherwise be entitled to.
Mutuality of Obligations in English (Labour) Law a. The origins
The introductory section of this paper noted the relevance that modern judicial reasoning places on the concept and test of 'mutuality of obligations' in the construction of -mainly but not exclusively -contracts of employment. The present section attempts to reconstruct the origins of the concept, both in doctrinal and jurisprudential terms, but also to trace and mapout its evolutionary trajectory, mostly by reference to case-law development. pushing English labour law away from both its more traditional voluntarist matrix but also from the 'employment (quasi) at will' paradigm that existed until then and that collective laissezfaire had at best masked and mitigated. 33 There is a fascinating analysis of these underlying developments in the opening pages of Chapter 4 of standard employment relationship had entered a process that was progressively leading to a certain degree of (no doubt incomplete) stabilization and continuity. As later noted by Freedland and Davies, '[i]t may well be that the twenty years from 1963 to 1983 will in retrospect be regarded as the two decades which saw the rise of the idea of job property in our labour law -and also perhaps, its partial or complete fall'. 34 In the mid-1970s, this was a process that labour law was still failing fully to comprehend, and that Freedland's The other remuneration. Otherwise there will be no consideration, and without consideration no contract') as 'mutual obligations', 57 thus effectively using the same label of mutuality to address both 'consideration' and the new 'essential ingredient' of mutuality as 'continuity'. The absence of either limb would result in a failure to identify the relationship as one regulated by a contract of employment.
Contract of Employment
Fast forward these important developments by a number of years and, in the case of Carmichael, we can see the House of Lords explicitly endorsing the idea that mutuality is a 'rock' on which workers' claim to a 'contractual relationship of any kind' 'founders', 58 and an understanding that Nethermere introduced a requirement for an 'irreducible minimum of mutual obligation necessary to create a contract of service' 59 an expression that was only used in Nethermere in Lord Kerr's dissenting opinion, mentioned above, and that was now somewhat being 'upgraded'. What is also relevant is that in Carmichael mutuality -or rather the lack of it -was deployed to defeat the claim that an 'umbrella contract' could be established for the purposes of creating continuity between various successive contracts (on the status of which their Lordships maintained an open, if agnostic, mind).
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Within a matter of years English courts had remoulded and completely transformed a concept that, in its early doctrinal elaborations, was meant to provide an analytical insight into an increasingly continuous and stable notion of contract of employment. Now it was being used as a prescriptive element, and as a test, to assess the presence of a contract of employment, and this was being done at the time in which -for various reasons that are outside the scope of this paper -arrangements for the provision of work and services in certain sectors of the labour markets were again becoming more and more fragmented and precarious.
c. The many faces of 'mutuality'
In the previous subsection we noted how a doctrinal device coined to provide a more accurate understanding of the implications of the increased stability in the provision of personal work, was eventually developed, re-moulded, and applied in a completely different context to the detriment of what, by then, was a growing number of precarious and short term workers. This subsection seeks to offer an overview of the ways in which, in more recent years, mutuality 55 if there are mutual obligations, and they relate in some way to the provision of, or payment for, work which must be personally provided by the worker, there will be a contract in the employment field; and if the nature and extent of the control is sufficient, it will be a contract of employment.'
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In short, to paraphrase this paragraph of the judgment in James v Greenwich, mutuality can impact on an employment status claim in at least three separate, but interlinked, ways. Firstly, the absence of a 'mutual irreducible minimal obligation' can defeat any attempts to establish that the relationship is contractual, presumably on the basis of the conflation between 'mutuality' and 'consideration' discussed in the previous sub-section. Secondly, 'the nature of those mutual obligations must be such as to give rise to a contract in the employment field' that is to say that if there is no mutuality, presumably in the form of mutual obligations for future performance, then the contract will not be seen as a contract for personal work. Benjamin's critical analysis 76 and suggesting that:
'[12] … when a court determines the question of an employment relationship, it must work with three primary criteria:
1. An employer's right to supervision and control;
2. Whether the employee forms an integral part of the organisation with the employer; and 3. The extent to which the employee was economically dependent upon the employer'. 'although when I get into my taxi, neither I nor the taxi-driver necessarily expect that the taxi-meter rates will be held for longer than during the present journey to the station, when I take somebody into my employment under a contract of employment, that worker will have some sort of expectation that I will hold the agreed wage rates for some defined period or on some defined conditions'.
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Finally it may be useful to assess our domestic notions of mutuality by reference to the benchmark of EU law. In this respect, one cannot fail to note that in the case of Allonby, the ECJ came very close to explicitly suggesting that 'mutuality of obligations' play no role in its assessment of who is a worker for the purposes of EU law. The Court held that
The formal classification of a self-employed person under national law does not exclude the possibility that a person must be classified as a worker within the meaning of Article 141(1) EC if his independence is merely notional, thereby disguising an employment relationship within the meaning of that article.
In the case of teachers who are, vis-à-vis an intermediary undertaking, under an obligation to undertake an assignment at a college, it is necessary in particular to consider the extent of any limitation on their freedom to choose their timetable, and the place and content of their work. [72] .
In the earlier case of Preston the Court was equally dismissive of the relevance attributed in English court to the circumstance that 'after the completion of any contract, there is no obligation on either party to enter into further such contracts', resulting in the absence of an 'umbrella contract' 84 as long as the workers could be held to be in 'a stable employment relationship resulting from a succession of short-term contracts concluded at regular intervals in respect of the same employment'.
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Before indulging into the faux pas of misusing the comparative method in an unduly prescriptive way, it may be appropriate to draw some provisional conclusions in respect of the relevance and meaning of this set of comparative considerations. Although the examples discussed above clearly suggest that the legal construction of contracts of employment is not inextricably linked to any of the English notions of mutuality of obligations, this should not be seen as necessarily prescribing the demise of mutuality of obligations in English labour law.
However these comparative observations may lend themselves to assisting us in reaching three significant, and no less radical and problematic, sets of provisional conclusions on 'mutuality' and on its contribution to Labour law's autonomy that are discussed in the following, and final, section of this paper.
Conclusions. Mutuality of obligations and the contested autonomy of labour law
The second section of this paper acknowledged that mutuality, properly understood, ought to be seen as an employment law requirement, rather than a contract law one. Its primary purpose is (or was intended to be) that of bringing to the fore in a meaningful way the relational aspects of the employment relationship that traditional contract law elements, such as contractual consideration, failed to acknowledge in any significant manner or shape. As noted in the opening paragraphs of section 3, there is little doubt that this is how 'the second tier' of the 'two-tiered structure' coined by Freedland in In this respect, the comparative enquiry of section 4 provided a number of insights on the contractual strictures just outlined. Firstly, it is quite apparent that the importance of recognising the elements of continuity and stability in employment relations is not inexorably connected with the English notion of 'mutual obligations for future performance'. A number of other legal notions of employee or worker, including the emerging EU 'worker' concept, reveal that the descriptive (and normative) value that English law attaches to continuity and stability is in fact wasted and pushed into an endless catch-22 when turned on its head and transformed into a (contractual) pre-requisite for recognising the existence of a contract of employment. So 'mutuality as a pre-condition for contractuality' is a proposition that does not seem to attract much credit in most other jurisdictions.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the idea of 'mutuality as a pre-condition for relationality' does not appear to withstand this kind of comparative scrutiny either. Several legal systems, including the EU legal system, are quite comfortable with the idea that a relationship in the employment field may well come to existence in the absence of a mutuality element, or in the presence of a 'non-mutuality clause', in individual contracts or in a succession of separate contracts. In fact, most foreign systems will go beyond this simple statement, and further accept the idea that in cases of discrepancy between the contract and the relationship, the reality of the latter ought to prevail over the formality of the former. The relationship between contractual formality and relational reality is an aspect of English labour law that English courts are just beginning to extricate. In line with other legal systems, they have sought to recognise the prevalence of the reality of the employment relationship over the legal fiction of the contractual arrangement when both parties have conspired to shape a contractual arrangement aimed at circumventing a legal requirement, as suggested by the 88 and Autoclenz, that they have moved on to recognise that when one of the parties, typically the employer, has abused of its 'relative bargaining power' by unilaterally producing a written agreement that fails to reflect the 'true agreement', then 'the reality of the relationship' ought to prevail over the written documentation. 89 There is however a third set of cases where a mismatch between the written agreement and the reality of the relationship can manifest itself without being attributed, strictly speaking, to either a conspiracy between the two parties of the contract to dissimulate their real arrangements, or to a unilateral abuse of power on the part of the employer dictating 'what the written agreement will say and the contractor/employee must take it or leave it', 90 thus resulting in a 'legal fiction', to use the terminology used by AG Geelhoed in his Opinion in Allonby. 91 These are the cases where, to borrow once more the Court's words in Allonby, 92 the contractual structure of the relationship is simply 'of no consequence' to the relationship itself in its specific context, though this admittedly requires a contextual analysis of the law that English courts have been traditionally reluctant to engage with. 93 Bearing in mind these two points, a third provisional and highly normative conclusion may be tentatively put forward. The time might have come for English law to reassess the function of mutuality of obligations, as well as the fiction on which its current uses are premised.
Arguably, the concept ought to embrace a more sober demeanour in which fewer, and arguably clearer, functions are assigned to it. And at the same time it ought to re-shape itself to fit our modern, diverse, and increasingly fragmented and precarious labour markets.
Mutuality understood as a contractually evidenced continuous and bilateral relationship between employer and employee and as a pre-requisite for a contract of service, postulates a labour market where employment relations develop along a paradigm of stability and subordination that is clearly increasingly challenged by the reality of contemporary human resource management arrangements. The time has arguably come for English labour law to recognise this and embrace a wider understanding of labour law as the law of personal work relations, 94 although admittedly such a shift may well require a new conceptualisation of the third essential element of the concept of 'autonomy' embraced by this paper, that is to say of the ideology underpinning the normative action and development of Labour law itself.
